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COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THEFT AND
DECEPTION OFFENSES IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
To appreciate the need for a revision of the Ohio offenses relating to
misappropriation of property by theft or deception, it is helpful to have in
mind the history of the common law crime of larceny. An understanding
of the common law is necessary because even though Ohio is said to have
only statutory crimes,' some statutes are so vague that the courts have turned
to common law precedents to give them meaning. A good example of
such a legislative enactment is found in the Ohio Revised Code larceny sec-
tion: "No person shall steal anything of value."'  The Ohio Supreme
Court has concluded: "Larceny, under the statute of this state, is the same
as at common law, and may be defined to be the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of another."3  There is, however,
an unhappy consequence in adopting the common law definition of the crime,
a consequence described by Professor Perkins:
Under the early law felonies were punishable by death, and larceny was a
common law felony... The judges, confronted with a strict law which
called for execution in felony cases (other than petit larceny), resorted to
various devices to prevent excessive executions. One such device was to
point out some peculiarity in the manner in which property had been ap-
propriated in a particular case and to hold that such a misdeed did not
constitute larceny.
This tendency resulted in many loop-holes in the enforcement of justice
and from time to time statutes were enacted in the effort to fill these gaps.
These statutes provided penalties (ordinarily less than death) for certain
misdeeds that had been held not to constitute larceny. The result is a
patchwork of offenses. The intricacies of this patchwork pattern are in-
testing as a matter of history but embarrassing as a matter of law en-
forcement. The judge is forced to take notice of hair-splitting distinctions
between various types of wrongful appropriation which are merely the
result of historical accident, and contribute nothing to the social problem
of protecting the property of individuals from predatory acts of others. 4
A few examples should suffice to indicate the inadequacy of the present
law. It is essential to common law larceny that there be a "trespassory
taking;" 5 that is, an appropriation without the consent of the owner. If
consent is obtained by deception, perhaps the actor can be prosecuted
for larceny by trick;6 however, that is an offense different than larceny.
I See Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466,469 (1861).
2 OHIo RV. CODE ANN. § 2907.20 (Page Supp. 1970).
a Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166, 170 (1873).
4 1 PR.ERNS, PnmaxNs ON CnmNAL LAW 232-33 (2d ed. 1969).
51d. at 234.
6 See State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 260-61, 87 N.E2d 358, 366-67 (Cuyahoga
County 1949).
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If an employee has been entrusted with property which he has wrongfully
converted, he might be convicted under the embezzlement statute, but
again, there is no larceny. In spite of the fact that all these crimes deal
with fundamentally similar types of acquisitive conduct, Ohio law provides
that if the facts of the trial show commission of an offense at variance with
that charged by the prosecution, the defendant may be acquitted." The
existing bulk, repetition, and fragmentation in the Jaw of theft present
a continuing threat to the efficient administration of criminal justice.
It is ironic that this same body of law is also underinclusive; that is, it
fails to cover all of the interests which should be protected. Perhaps the
most glaring example of this problem can be seen in the exclusion of ser-
vices from the scope of larceny. Under present Ohio law, only personal
property can be the subject of a larceny. In an economy that is increasingly
service-oriented, this restriction seems completely arbitrary. From the per-
spective of a victim of a theft, it should make no difference whether the
loss is of a thing or of a fee-both are social harms which should be
treated equally. While the omission of services might be corrected by re-
medial legislation, this is precisely the piecemeal approach which has left
the law in such an unsatisfactory state. A revision of the fundamental
structure of the offenses of theft and deception is clearly needed. The
drafters of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code recognized this need in
stating that it was their goal to produce a "compact yet complete substan-
tive criminal code. . . ... 10 It is the purpose of this note to consider the
changes in the theft and fraud offenses suggested in the Proposed Code
both in its original form and in the form passed by the Ohio House of
Representatives."
II. CONSOLIDATION OF OFFENSES
An examination of the chapter dealing with theft and fraud begins
with § 2913.02, the basic theft section which contains one of the most
sweeping consolidation efforts of the Proposed Code. In language that is
new to Ohio, the original proposal read: "No person, with purpose to
deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly: (1) obtain or
7 See Griffith v. State, 93 Ohio St. 294,297, 112 N.E. 1017, 1018 (1915).
8 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196, 199 (1877): "[1]f there are variances between the
allegations and the proof offered, the defendant, for that reason alon2, must not be acquitted,
unless, in the opinion of the court, the variance is material or may be prejudicial to the de-
fendant."
9 Final Report of the Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROP. OHIO CRlI.
CODE]. The text of the proposed legislation is incorporated in HOUSE BILL NUMBBR 511,
109th Ohio General Assembly (1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. No. 511].
10 PROP. Orno CRIM. CODE, Introduction at ix.
11PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE (as amended in SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL NUMBER 511)
[hereinafter cited as SUB. H.B. No. 511).
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exert control over either without the consent of the owner or person au-
thorized to give consent; (2) obtain control over either by threat."'' For
purposes of consolidation, the key words are "obtain or exert control" be-
cause, in a single phrase, they bring together in one statute the old offenses
of larceny and embezzlement. It is unfortunate that these important terms
are not defined in the Proposed Code so as to make the intended effect of
the law more explicit. Illinois, using language similar to that of the Ohio
Proposed Code, did specify the definitions of these words. The Illinois law
provides that "obtain" means: "(a) In relation to property, to bring about
a transfer of interest or possession, whether to the offender or to another,
and (b) In relation to labor or services, to secure the performance there-
of."'" Also, the Illinois law provides that the phrase "obtains or exerts con-
trol" "includes but is not limited to the taking, carrying away, or the sale,
conveyance, or transfer of title to, or interest in, or possession of property."' 4
Unlike the present law, the proposed formulation of theft would not re-
quire a determination of technical questions such as whether the original
taking was lawful or trespassory. Rather, the focus would be on whether
the accused acted without the consent of the owner or beyond the autho-
rized control; if either is found to be the case, the actor may be convicted
of theft.
The second phrase of the theft statute carries the consolidation further
by containing a prohibition against obtaining control "by threat." Again,
unfortunately, the Proposed Code fails to define an essential term. Early
drafts of the working papers of the Technical Committee indicate that a
rather extensive definition was contemplated 5 to distinguish a threat made
to accomplish a theft from similar offenses such as robbery and extortion.
While some overlapping may be unavoidable, the legislature should indi-
cate the bounds in which courts are expected to impose liability for theft
by threat.
In the original proposal, a parallel but separate section was included in
the chapter on theft and fraud which proscribed theft "by deception."1
(Such a provision is needed to encompass the existing offenses of larceny
by trick and false pretense.) The decision by the Tednical Committee
to segregate the new fraud offense was justified on the ground that the
12 PRoP. OsIO CE.I!L CODE § 2913.02(A). The final version of this important Eection
reads:
No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall know-
ingly obtain or exert control over either. (1) without the consent of the owner or
person authorized to give consent, (2) beyond the scope of the express or implied
consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent, (3) by deception; (4)
by threat.
12 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 15-7 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
14 Id. § 15-8.
15 The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
39 (Dec. 10, 1968).
16 PRop. OrIo CI. CODE § 2913A1.
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element of deceit made it sufficiently distinct to warrant separate treatment.
This choice would have been acceptable if the Technical Committee had
recommended the adoption of a general consolidation provision similar to
that suggested in the Model Penal Code:
Conduct denominated theft in this Article constitutes a single offense
embracing the separate offenses heretofore known as larceny, embezzle-
ment, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving
stolen property, and the like. An accusation of theft may be supported by
evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under
this Article, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the
indictment or information, subject only to the power of the Court to en-
sure fair trial by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where
the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or
surprise.' 7
Without such a provision, the Proposed Code would have fallen short of
the optimum consolidation effort since it would still be a guessing game to
determine in some cases whether the facts would support a charge under
one statute or another. Happily, this contingency was precluded by the
•House of Representatives which put the deception language back into the
basic theft provision, § 2913.02. Consequently, the Proposed Code offers
a unified and rational statute covering almost any conceivable kind of
acquisitive behavior.
III. Tm: OFFENSE OF THEFT
A. Subject Matter of Theft
In delineating the scope of the subject matter for which theft liability
can be imposed, the Proposed Code is written to remedy some of the pres-
ent law's shortcomings. The theft section, as mentioned earlier, would ex-
tend liability for misappropriating "property or services." While personal
property has always been protected, the new definition of property would in-
clude "any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, and any inter-
est or license in such property."'18 Such a definition cannot be faulted for
being too restrictive since it seems virtually all-inclusive. Indeed, it can be
argued that the definition goes too far. The Model Penal Code draws a
distinction between movable and immovable property, and in respect to
the latter, disallows the possibility that it can be the subject of theft.19
In explaining this distinction, a commentary to an early draft of the Model
Penal Code suggests that since realty is stationary, the doctrine of adverse
possession provides an adequate civil remedy so that no criminal law inter-
vention is needed. Furthermore, as the commentary points out, failure to
17 MODEL PENAL CODE [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.J § 223.1 (Proposed Official Draft,
1961) [hereinafter cited as P.O.D.].
Is PROp. Omo ClM. CODE § 2901.01(j) (as amended in Sun. HB. No. 511).
19M.P.C. § 223.0(4) (P.O.D.).
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exclude real property could involve the criminal process in a landlord-
tenant dispute in a situation where a lessee deliberately overstayed his
lease?0 While such a possibility might be avoided by judicial construc-
tion, the decision should not be left to the courts unless the legislature
specifically intends theft liability to be so extended.
The inclusion of services in the theft offense does represent a major
innovation in Ohio law. "Services" is broadly defined to encompass "la-
bor, personal services, professional services, public utility services, food,
drink, transportation, and entertainment.' '-2 1  Clearly, theft liability can be
imposed for misappropriating services which are ordinarily available only
for compensation. Among such services are a haircut and a house call by
a physician. Illinois, following the suggestion of an early draft of the
Model Penal Code, restricted its theft liability to those services available
"for hire."22  Although the Illinois and Model Penal Code formulations
were considered by the drafters of the Ohio Proposed Code m the definition
of services contains no such restriction. As passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, the proposal seems to leave open the possibility of a prosecution
for using services for which no compensation was expected. The only
suggestion to the contrary is found in the section defining deprivation of
services. That section prohibits accepting services with the purpose of not
giving "proper consideration in return therefor. -"2 4 Thus, it can be argued
that proper consideration can only be determined when the services were
for hire.
B. The Culpable Mental State
According to the traditional concepts of criminal law, there is usually
no crime unless an act is coupled with a specified mental state. Making
no great change from the present law, the Proposed Code adopts this prem-
ise in the theft offense: "No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either.
. . ."I Fortunately, all of the operative terms of this mens rea require-
20 P.C. § 206.1(2)(a), Comment at 63 (Tent. Draft No. 1,1953).
2 1 
PROP. OMO CRINL CODE § 2913.01(E). The final version passed by the House also
includes a new section which specifically prohibits fraudulently hiring certain kinds of vehides
or fraudulently engaging hotel, motel, or campground accommodations. PROP. OHIO CRaM.
CODE § 2913A1 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
2 2 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-3 (Smith-Hurd P.P. 1972). See generally MP.C. §
206.7, Comment at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
23 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE, Introduction at viii.
24 PRop. OHIO CalM. CODE § 2913.01(C)(3) (as amended in Su. H.B. No. 511) (em-
phasis supplied). The value of services would be based on fair maket value, a concept
which is defined in amended § 2913.61(D)(3) as:
Mhe money consideration which a buyer would give and a seller would accept
for property or services, assuming that the buyer is willing to buy and the seller
is willing to sell, that both are fully informed as to all facts material to the trans-
actioa, and that neither is under any compulsion to act.
2 Id. § 2913.02(A) (emphasis supplied).
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ment are carefully defined. One acts purposely "when it is his specific
intention to cause a certain result. -"0 In this section, the result which
must be specifically intended by the actor is to "deprive" another of prop-
erty or services which means to:
(1) Withhold property of another permanently, or for such period as to
appropriate a substantial portion of its value or use, or with purpose to
restore it only upon payment of a reward or other consideration;
(2) Dispose of property so as to make it unlikely tha: the owner will re-
cover it;
(3) Accept, use, or appropriate money, property, or services, with purpose
not to give proper consideration in return therefor.27
It is not required that the actor intend that the owner never recover his
property, or that the owner receive no consideration for his property or
services. Rather, a flexible standard is established which sets a more rea-
sonable understanding of deprivation from the perspective of the victim
of the theft. The burden is upon the prosecution, however, to demonstrate
that the act of obtaining or exerting control was concurrent with a pur-
pose to deprive as defined above.
The theft section appears to add another mental element to the of-
fense, namely, that the actor "knowingly" obtain or exert control over prop-
erty or services. If knowledge is all that is required, a less culpable mental
state is involved, for all that need be shown is that the actor was "aware
that his conduct [was] likely to cause a certain result .... ,"2 Doubt is
cast upon the significance of the knowledge requirement by the existence
of a fraud section in the original proposal which, although exactly parallel
to the theft section, omits any mention of knowledge. 2  A court reading
the House-passed version of the Proposed Code may conclude, however,
that purpose must be proved only with respect to deprivation, and that for
all other elements of the offense, proof of knowledge is sufficient for con-
viction.
C. Ownership and Consent
Another prerequisite to conviction for theft under the Proposed Code
is the unauthorized exercise of control over property or services; that is,
control either without the consent of the owner or person authorized to
give consent, or beyond the scope of the express or implied consent given.
"Owner" is defined (with some unnecessary circularity) as "any person,
other than the actor, who is the owner of, or who has possession or control




2 9 PROP. Ohio CaRm. CODE § 2913.41.
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ownership, possession, control, license, or interest is unlawful."'  Insofar
as this definition allows one who stole from another thief to be prosecuted
for theft, there is no change in Ohio law.31 However, the language is de-
signed to leave no doubt that one can be guilty of theft from a co-owner,
a partner, or a spouse. In regard to the last-mentioned class, spousal
theft, the Proposed Code breaks with the Model Penal Code which would
allow a prosecution only if the theft had occurred after the parties ceased
living together32 While it is possible that the courts may become more in-
volved in family disputes due to the abrogation of spousal immunity for
theft, there is no good reason to grant immunity to a thief simply because
he is married to his victim.
From the absence of a definition of "consent," it appears that the legis-
lature did not intend to alter the traditional meaning of that term. In an
,early draft of the Model Penal Code, it was suggested that effective consent
txdudes "(i) consent obtained by deception or coercion; and (ii) consent of
one who is manifestly disqualified by youth, mental defect, intoxication, or
the like, to make reasonable property disposition."a 3 Since such a defini-
tion would make explicit the common law construction of consent, it can be
argued that the definition ought to be in the Proposed Code. Because no
change will result either from inclusion or exclusion, the proposal is really
not weakened by the absence of an explicit definition.
D. Affirmative Defenses
An additional topic to be discussed in regard to theft is affirmative
defenses. The original version of the Proposed Code contained three ex-
plicit affirmative defenses to a charge of theft:
(1) The actor was unaware that the property or service involved was that
of another.
(2) The actor acted under an honest claim of right to acquire, keep, or
dispose of the property or service involved as he did.
(3) The actor took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and
pay for it promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, if present,
would have consented. 34
The first and third of these affirmative defenses are merely an application
of the theory that mistake of fact, which negates the required mental state
(here, purpose to deprive), results in exculpation33 For instance, if the ac-
30 PRop. OHno CRn& CODE § 2913.01(D) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
31 State v. Shoemaker, 96 Ohio St. 570, 572, 117 N.E. 958 (1917): "If the taking was
'wrongful,' it did not matter who owned the property in question. So far as the thief was
concerned it didn't make any difference who owned it. He did not."
32pLP.C. § 223.1(4) (P.O.D.).
33 IP.C. § 206.1(5)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
34 PRop. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2913.02(B).
35 Id. § 2901.34. The section reads:
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tor honestly, but mistakenly, believed property to be his own, or to belong
to no one, he is guilty of no culpable wrong in taking it. The second
affirmative defense listed above deals with a claim of right, a defense
grounded in mistake of law. For example, if a seller mistakenly believed
that he had the right to repossess property, the mistake would be one of
law rather than of fact. This distinction between mistakes of law and fact
is important to the affirmative defenses to theft because of changes made
in the Proposed Code as finally passed by the House. First, the affirma-
tive defenses were entirely deleted from the theft section. Second, mis-
takes of fact which negate the required mental state are recognized while
mistakes of law, such as a claim of right defense, are not."' The conse-
quence of this distinction is the creation of an arbitrary division between
two types of mistake, both of which demonstrate the absence of an es-
sential element of criminal liability-a guilty mind. Judging from this
consequence, the original formulation of the proposed code was more
rational than the version finally passed by the House.
E. Penalties
Consistent with the goal of consolidating the theft offenses, 7 the penal
sanctions provided in the Proposed Code would both update and systema-
tize the present law:
Whoever violates this section is guilty of theft. If the value of the
property or services stolen is less than one hundred fifty dollars, violation
of this section is petty theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the
value of the property or services stolen is one hundred fifty dollars or
more, or if the property stolen is any of the property listed in section
2913.71 of the Revised Code, or if the offender has previously been con-
victed of a theft offense, then violation of this section is grand theft, a
felony of the fourth degree.38
The most visible change in the penalties is the shift from sixty' to one
hundred fifty dollars as the dividing line between petty and grand theft.
Although the dollar change is little more than a reflection of the decreased
value of our currency, it is significant that the grading of offenses was kept
intact.40 That is, the seriousness of the theft offense is still based on the
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is an affirmative defense
to a criminal charge if any of the following apply: (1) The ignorance or mistake
plainly negates the culpable mental state required to establish any element of the
offense; (2) The section describing the offense provides that ignorance or mistake
constitutes a defense.
'
0 PROP. OHIO CraM. CODE § 2901.34 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
37 PROP. OHIo CRiM. CODE § 2913.02, Committee Comments at 154.
38 PROP. OHIO CprM. CODE § 2913.02(B) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
39 OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 2907.20 (Page Supp. 1970).
40 But see M.P.C. § 223.1(2) (P.O.D.). The M.P.C. abandons the traditional two grades
of theft in order to establish a third category for offenders who have stolen property of
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value of the property or services stolen, and all thefts are either felonies or
misdemeanors. Because of the importance of value in determining the sen-
tence the offender is to receive, it is surprising that the original version made
no provision for fixing the value of the stolen property or services. For-
tunately, the version passed by the House did correct this oversight by
providing a rather elaborate section for value determination.4' Much of
the proposed statute would merely codify the existing Ohio common law.
For example, the Proposed Code requires the jury to return a finding of the
value of the property or services at the time of the offense, but does not
require a specification of the exact value if it can be determined that the
amount involved is or is not sufficient for a grand theft conviction. One
important change in the Proposed Code is that for some property such as
personal effects, household goods and business supplies, the value is to be
determined by the "cost of replacing such property with new property of
like kind and quality... [if the property retains] substantial utility for its
purpose regardless of its age or condition...., 4 . The way the proposal is
written, replacement value is to be used as the primary method of deter-
mining value for such property, and only when this standard is inapplicable
is the traditional fair market value formula to be used. Thus, while the
value of goods must be greater to result in a conviction for grand theft,
the method for determining that value seems calculated to make the one
hundred fifty dollar minimum easier for the prosecution to prove. More-
over, there are certain kinds of property which are to be treated as grand
theft regardless of actual value. The original proposal would have limited
such treatment to credit cards, firearms, and certain kinds of explosives!-'
The House amended version, however, would automatically extend grand
theft treatment to motor vehicles, checks and certain other negotiable in-
struments, license plates, and blank forms for certain kinds of certificates
of title. 4
A rather arbitrary approach is suggested for repeat offenders since
upon them falls the special opprobrium of grand theft regardless of the
value of the property or services stolen either in a past or present offense.
The scope of this provision is even broader than it initially appears since
"theft offense" is defined to encompass robbery, burglary, breaking and
entering, safecracking, tampering with a coin machine, theft (including
all of the previously separate crimes such as embezzlement and larceny),
unauthorized use of property, passing bad checks, forgery, criminal simula-
tion, making or using slugs, tampering with records, securing writings by
little value (under fifty dollars) and who have not employed force in the commission of the
offense.
4 1 PRoP. Omo C . CODE § 2913.61 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
42 Id. § 2913.61(D)(2) (emphasis supplied).
43 PROP. OrIo CdrmL CODE § 2913.02(C).
4 4 PRop. OrIO CamrL CODE § 2913.71 (as amended in SUB. I-LB. No. 511).
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deception, personating an officer, defrauding creditors, cheating, corrupt-
ing sports, theft in office, counterfeiting, or conspiracy to commit any of
these offenses.45 The Proposed Code would be more severe with repeat
petty thieves than existing Ohio law, which provides a greater penalty on a
second conviction for petty theft, but still classifies the offense as a misde-
meanor.46  In justifying the new penalty structure making a second con-
viction for any theft offense a felony, it was suggested that since local
jails provide little more than "cold storage facilities," the state penitentiary
offered a greater chance for rehabilitation.41 Whether or not inmates of
the state penitentiary are rehabilitated seems at best to be a matter of de-
bate. If lawmakers are intent upon convicting a man for a more serious
grade of crime and sentencing him to a longer term of incarceration, the
rehabilitation on which such treatment is premised ought to be more than
a penological goal. Absent an effective program of rehabilitation, the pri-
mary purpose served by the imposition of felony status on a repeat of-
fender is vengeance.
F. Aggregation
Aggregation concerns the combining of several offenses into a single
prosecution. The original version of the Proposed Code began by stating
the traditional Ohio principle:48 "Where more than one item of property
or services is involved in a theft offense, the value of the property or ser-
vices involved for the purpose of determining the degree of the offense is
the aggregate value of all property or services involved in the offense."4
A substantive change in Ohio law was suggested by providing that a series
of misdemeanors, if the value of the property or services in each offense
were under one hundred fifty dollars, and if the aggregate value were over
that amount, could be prosecuted as a single felony.5" This provision, in
the original version of the Proposed Code, was even broader than the one
suggested by the Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code would permit
aggregation of a number of petty thefts into a single felony prosecution,
but would do so only when the thefts were "committed pursuant to one
scheme or course of conduct. . . ."r, By the time the House completed its
revision of the Proposed Code, the section dealing with aggregation had
451d. § 2913.02(K).
4 6
r OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.20 (Page Supp. 1970).
47 I~op. OHIo CRem. CoDE § 2913.02, Committee Comments at 158.
48 State v. Hennessey, 23 Ohio St. 339, 349 (1872): "Where several articles of property
are stolen at the same time, the transaction being the same, the whole, although they belong
to different owners, may be embraced in one count of the indictm.nt, and the taking thereof
charged as one offense."
4 9 PROp. OHIO CaM,. CODE § 2913.61(A).
50 Id. § 2913.61(B).
51 MLP.C. § 223.1(2)(c) (P.O.D.).
[Vol. 3
CBIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
been cut back considerably. The final version would allow aggregation of
offenses only when the thefts were committed "by the offender in his same
employment, capacity, or relationship to another. . . ..,2 The House-
amended version makes it less likely that petty thefts can be aggregated,
and also less likely that judges will be able to employ the "swing sentence"
approach to treat a felony as a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes 3
Thus, a series of unrelated offenses will probably result in a more severe
sanction under the final version since the judge will not have the discre-
tion to view the offenses as a single transgression.
IV. OFFENSES RELATED T o Tmhr
A. Unauthorized Use
It should be noted that the basic theft provision, § 2913.02, while the
most sweeping of all sections dealing with theft and deception, is only one
part of the comprehensive treatment of such crimes. Subsequent sections
modify and expand the law in this area. Perhaps the most important modi-
fication is the distinction made between stealing property and merely
using it: "No person shall knowingly use or operate the property of an-
other without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give con-
sent." 4 To satisfy the mens rea element of this section, the unauthorized
use of property requires only a knowing55 use or operation. The concept
is similar to an existing Ohio law which forbids unauthorized use of any
motor vehicle. In adopting the theory that use is a less serious offense
than deprivation, the Proposed Code extends the idea to encompass all
property, but sets a higher penalty if the property involved is an "air-
craft, motor vehicle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehile. . .. ""
Unlike the theft provision, the section dealing with unauthorized use does
contain explicit affirmative defenses. That is, if the actor reasonably be-
lieved that he was authorized to use or operate the property, or if he rea-
sonably believed that the owner or person empowered to give consent
would have authorized the use or operation of the property, there is no
culpability and no crime 8s
2TRop. OnHO Caj. CODE § 2913.61(C) (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
531d. § 2929.05(G).
5ld. § 2913.04(A).
r' PROP. OsIO CRML CODE § 2901.22.
06 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(B) (Page 1965).
57 PROP. OMIO CaItL CODE § 2913.03 (as amended in SuB. -B. No. 5 11). If a vehicle
is merely being operated without the owner's consent, the offense is a first-degree misde-
meanor. If, however, the vehide is kept for more than two days, or if it is xemoved from
the state, or if the offender has previously been convicted of a theft offense, the crime is
considered a fourth-degree felony.
5Sd. §§ 2913.03(C) and 2913.04(B).
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B. Criminal Conversion
An extension of the law of theft was suggested in the original proposal
by the creation of the offense of criminal conversion:
No person, who comes into control of property of another which he
knows was lost, mislaid, or delivered under mistake as to its nature,
amount, or value, or as to the identity of the recipient, shall, with purpose
to deprive the owner thereof, fail to take reasonable measures to restore
the property to a person entitled to have it.5o
The proposal was designed to cover those situations where property comes
into one's hands fortuitously, and thereafter is converted by the finder to
his own use or ownership. The proposed section was drafted in terms of
"control" to avoid any possibility of creating an absolute duty to take steps
to return lost or mislaid property. Furthermore, by requiring "reason-
able measures" to be taken, the proposal would have allowed a flexible de-
termination of what those measures would be, based on considerations
such as the value of the misplaced property and the likelihood of finding
the true owner. The impact of the statute would have been to compel the
finder of property to take steps to return it to the rightful owner. Un-
fortunately, the House-amended version of the Proposed Code deleted this
section entirely. It should be noted that much of the behavior which was
intended to be covered by the criminal conversion provision may be pun-
ished under the theft or unauthorized use sections. Without a specific
provision dealing with lost or mislaid property, however, it may be difficult
for the prosecution to show a purpose to deprive or a knowing use of an-
other's property. The original version of the Proposed Code seems to
have been better designed to discourage this kind of antisocial behavior.
C. Receiving Stolen Property
Another section which expands the basic theft offense is that of receiv-
ing stolen property. Although this is not a new crime, the Proposed Code
does work a few significant changes in its formulation: "No person shall
receive, retain, or dispose of the property of another, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe it has been obtained through commission of a
theft offense."160 Unlike present Ohio law, which requires the prosecutor
to prove that the receiver of property had knowledge that it was stolen,01
the Proposed Code would only require proof that the actor should have
known that the property was obtained by a theft offense.2 Under the orig-
inal proposal, the accused was given a chance at exculpation: "This sec-
59 PROP. OHIO CRIM. CODE § 2913.03 (A).
60 PROP. OHIO CMIM. CODE § 2913.51(A) (as amended in Sun. H.B. No. 511).
61 Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2907.30 (Page 1954): "No person shall buy, rcceive, or con-
ceal anything of value which has been stolen... knowing it to have been stolen ..
432 Seenote 60 supra, and the statute cited.
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tion does not apply to a person who receives, retains, or disposes of prop-
erty with purpose to restore it to the owner."63 Such an exception is only
reasonable since there can be no justification in imposing liability on one
who had no intent to make the property his own. The House-amended
version, however, deletes this provision.
It is not dear why the section on receiving stolen property does not
include a provision, as suggested by the Model Penal Code," which would
raise a presumption of knowledge in one who deals in stolen property.
Since the unavailability of a fence for stolen property would tend to make
any organized theft operation economically unfeasible, and since potential
dealers might be deterred by the prospect of a more certain conviction,
there is good reason to include such a provision.
V. OFFENSES COMMITTED THROUGH DECEPTION
A. Fraud
As indicated earlier, fraud is now covered in the proposed theft offense
section: "No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either... by decep-
tion.6  The word "by," which precedes the word "deception," indicates
the need to demonstrate a causal connection between the deceit and the
appropriation in order to win a conviction under this provision. Thus, as
an element of the offense, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show
that there was a knowing deception to satisfy the mens rea requirement.t 6
As for the meaning of deception as used in this chapter, the Proposed
Code offers an extremely broad definition:
'Deception' means knowingly deceiving another or causing another to
be deceived, by any false or misleading representation, by withholding in-
formation, by preventing another from acquiring information, or by any
other conduct, act, or omission which creates, confirms, or perpetuates a
false impression in another, including a false impression as to law, value,
state of mind, or other objective or subjective fact. °3
Insofar as the proposed definition proscribes creating a false or misleading
impression to appropriate another's property, there is no major change in
Ohio law." ' The Proposed Code, like the Model Penal Code,c3 would ex-
G3 PROP. OHo CaML CODE § 2913.51(B).
6 4 LP.C. § 223.6 (P.O.D.).
65PRop. OHO Cu.L CODE § 2913.02 (as amended in SUB. H.13. NO. 511).
66 Id. § 2901.21 (A) (2): "[A) person is not guilty of an offense unless ... he has the req-
uisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by
the section defining the offense."
67 Id. § 2913.01(A).
68Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.21 (Page Supp. 1970): "No perzoa shall obtain pos-
session of, or title to, anything of value with the consent of the person from whom he ob-
tained it, provided he induced such consent by false or fraudulent rcpresentation, pretesue,
token, or writing."
69P.C. § 223.3 (P.O.D.).
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tend liability for fraud to those situations where the actor prevented the
victim from acquiring information which would dispel a falsely created im-
pression, or where the actor confirmed a pre-existing false impression. In-
deed, the draft finally approved by the House would seem to go farther
by making illegal "withholding information.., which ... confirms or per-
petuates a false impression in another . . . . 70 This language does not
preclude the possibility that one could be held liable for fraud for failure
to correct a false impression held by the victim, even though the actor
did not create that impression. Consequently, this language is unlike that
in the Model Penal Code which penalizes only a failure to dispel a false
impression not created by the actor when there is a confidential or fiduciary
relationship between the parties.7' The proposed Ohio law would seem
to leave open the interpretation that there is an absolute duty of full dis-
closure of all relevant information. For example, consider the situation
of a mine owner, who, having discovered that his mine was nearly ex-
hausted of ore, sells it to a stranger even though the seller was fully aware
that the buyer was under the mistaken belief that the property was still
valuable as a mine.7 Under the Proposed Code definition of deception,
there is no reason why the disappointed buyer could not press charges on
the ground that the seller had withheld information which perpetuated a
false impression in the mind of the buyer. Furthermore, the buyer would
argue that there existed the requisite "purpose to deprive" when the seller
accepted the money of the buyer "with purpose not to give proper consider-
ation in return therefor."'7 It is doubtful that the drafters of the Proposed
Code intended such a result, and it is also possible that the courts may re-
fuse to read the provision to allow a seller to be prosecuted for what has
long been an accepted commercial practice-getting the benefit of the bar-
gain. Of course, the simplest way to avoid this untoward consequence
would be to change the language of the definition of deception.
On a related subject, by failing to include a provision dealing with de-
ceptive business practices, the Proposed Code seems to have fallen short of
creating a comprehensive and effective system to guard against fraud. Al-
though such a provision was considered by the drafters of the original pro-
posal,74 patterned after the Model Penal Code,7" there is no mention of it
in the Proposed Code as introduced in the House of Representatives. There
appear to be three reasons for inclusion in the criminal code of a provision
70 PROP. OHIo GRIM. CODE § 2913.01(A) (as amended in SUB. 1.B. NO. 511).
71 M.P.C. § 223.3(c) (P.O.D.).
72 M.P.C. § 206.2, Comment at 67 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
73 See PROP. OHIO CUMf. CODE §§ 2913.41, 2913.01(A), and 2913.01(C)(3) (as amended
in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
74The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No. 41 (G)
at I (Dec. 4, 1968).
75 M.P.C§ 224.7 (P.O.D.).
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aimed at eliminating deceptive business practices: (1) It is advantageous to
bring the various categories of deceptive practice together in a single sec-
tion for consistent treatment of common issues such as mens rea and pun-
ishment;76 (2) Businessmen are usually assumed to know about or have
means of obtaining correct information in their particular portion of the
business world, so recklessness should suffice to convict the accused;7 7 and
(3) Considering the potential for harm in situations such as possessing a
false weight or measure, there is little reason to wait until the deceiver has
actually obtained property, or even comes so dose as to fall within the com-
pass of the attempt statute.7 8 Should the version of the law ultimately
adopted not contain a section specifically concerned with deceptive business
practices, there is language in the Proposed Code which could be used to
punish many kinds of such deceit. In addition to the possibility of prose-
cution of an individual for fraud or attempted fraud, the Proposed Code
provides for organizational liability, and also for personal accountability
for organizational misconduct."0
B. Forgery, Criminal Simulation, and Tampering with Records
Three sections included in the theft and fraud chapter forbid acts done
with "purpose to defraud." These are forgery,8' criminal simulation,- and
tampering with records.to To defraud is to "knowingly obtain, by decep-
tion, some benefit for oneself or another, or to knowingly cause, by decep-
tion, some detriment to another."" To fall within the prohibition of one
of these provisions, then, it is not necessary to show that an act was done to
advantage the actor, but only that the actor was aware that his conduct was
likely to result in some detriment to the victim of the deceit.
Forgery, while not a new crime, would be newly defined to mean: "to
fabricate or create, in whole or in part and by any means, any spurious
writing, or to make, execute, alter, complete, reproduce, or otherwise pur-
port to authenticate any writing, when such writing in fact is not authenti-
cated thereby."8 5 Furthermore, in keeping with a general theme of consoli-
dation through definition, "writing"' means: "any document, letter, memo-
randum, note, paper, plate, film, or other thing having in or upon it any
76 A£P.C. § 206.46, Comment at 123 (Tear Draft No. 2,1954).
77The Technical Committee to Study Ohio Criminal Laws and Procedures, Draft No.
41(G) at 2 (Dec. 4, 1968).
78 LP.C. § 206.24, Comment at 121 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
79 PROP. OMO Caf. CODE § 2901.23 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
80 1d. § 2901.24.
811d. § 2913.31.
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written, typewritten, or printed matter, and also means any token, stamp,
seal, credit card, badge, trademark, label, or other symbol of value, right,
privilege, license, or identification.""0  It would be hard to conceive of a
type of forgery that would not fall within the ambit of such a statute.
A companion section to the forgery provision is tampering with rec-
ords; this forbids the falsification, destruction, removal, concealment, alter-
ation, defacement, or mutilation of any writing or record. It is interesting
that while forgery provides but a single penalty for that offense, tamper-
ing with records carries a penalty which is dependent upon the kind of
record with which the offender has tampered.
Criminal simulation likewise carries only a single penalty, but that is
because there is but a single kind of harm proscribed by the section. This
offense would be new to Ohio since it would forbid one to
make or alter any object so that it appears to have value because of an.
tiquity, rarity, curiosity, source, or authorship, which it does not in fact
possess . . . or practice deception in making, retouching, editing, or re-
producing any photograph, movie film, video tape, phonograph record, or
recording tape .... 88
If adopted, this proposal would extend to the falsification of objects the
same sanction provided for misrepresenting writings, that is, forgery. Crim-
inal simulation, like the sections on forgery and tampering with records,
includes a prohibition against "uttering." This means that one may not
"issue, publish, transfer, use, put or send into circulation, deliver, or dis-
play""9 any writing or object which had been falsified in contravention of
the Proposed Code.
C. Personation, Securing Writings by Deception,
and Fraud in Insolvency
Three other sections relating to deception, while presenting nothing
new to Ohio law, do make some noteworthy changes. The first of these
concerns personating" an officer, which includes in addition to a law en-
forcement officer, "an inspector, investigator, or agent of any governmental
agency."'" Unfortunately, "governmental agency" is not defined; as a
result, there remains uncertainty as to what organizations are intended to be
covered. It is clear from the statute, however, that personation would be
86ld. § 2913.01().
87 Id. § 2913.42(B): "If the writing or record is a will unrevok,d at the time of the of-
fense, or a record kept by or belonging to a governmental agency, tampering with records is
a felony of the fourth degree."
881d. § 2913.32.
89Id. § 2913.01(H).
90 "Personate" is the correct legal term for this offense. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY
1301 (4th ed. 1968).
91 PROP. OMo CRM. CODE § 2913.44 (as amended in SUB. H.B. No. 511).
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unlawful when done with purpose to defraud, with knowledge of facilita-
tion of a fraud, or with purpose to induce another to purchase property or
services.?
The second fraud-related offense appears to be merely a spin-off of the
basic fraud section since it prohibits causing another, by deception, to
execute a writing "which disposes of or encumbers propery, or by which a
pecuniary obligation is incurred."9 3 This provision would broaden exist-
ing law by expanding the scope of the present offense dealing with unlaw-
ful procurement of a signature.94
A similar expansion of Ohio law would be effected by adoption of the
section which prohibits fraud in insolvency. 5 The Proposed Code would
make illegal certain acts, such as concealing or conveying property to frus-
trate the interests of creditors. It is interesting to note that while present
Ohio law9 applies to any debtor, the original proposal would have ap-
plied only to a debtor who knew that "proceedings have been or are about
to be instituted for the appointment of a fiduciary, or that an assignment or
any other arrangement for the benefit of creditors has been or is about to be
made . . .. 97 Clearly, the restriction was designed to limit the interposi-
tion of the criminal process into debtor-creditor relationships to those situ-
ations where the debtor was, or was soon likely to be, insolvent. This is
the approach recommended by the Model Penal Code. 8  The House-
amended version of the Proposed Code rejected that approach, however,
and re-drafted the section so that it could be used against any debtor, not
just against an insolvent one.
D. Slugs, Checks, and Credit Cards
Remaining in the chapter on theft and fraud are three sections peculiar
to our modern economic way of life. The first deals with making or using
slugs for a coin machine.9 9 As is often done in the Proposed Code, change
is brought about through definition of the operative terms. In this sec-
tion, present law is expanded by defining "coin machine" to mean "any
mechanical or electronic device designed to do both of the following: (1)
receive a coin or bill, or token made for that purpose; (2) in return for
the insertion or deposit of a coin, bill, or token, automatically dispense prop-
erty, provide a service, or grant a license." 1°0  By using such broad lan-
9 2 id.
93 ld. § 2913.43.
94 OHIo REV. CODE AiN. § 2911.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
95 PROP. OHIO CRIL CODE § 2913.45 (as amended in SUB. ILB. No. 511).
9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.12 (Page 1954).
9 7 PROP. OFHO CRUi. CODE § 2913.45.
9 8 ALP.C. § 224.11 (P.O.D.).
P9 PROP. OHIo CML CODE § 2913.33 (as amended in SUB. I-LB. No. 511).
100 Id. § 2913.01(1).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
guage, the Proposed Code would allow the coverage of the law to keep
pace with the advance of machine technology.
Passing bad checks under the Proposed Code would, of course, still be
,unlawful: "No person, with purpose to defraud, shall issue or transfer or
Icause to be issued or transferred a check or other negotiable instrument,
knowing that it will be dishonored." 101 The section goes farther by pro-
viding that a rebuttable presumption of knowledge arises when: (1) the
drawer had no account with the drawee at the time of the issue or the
stated date, whichever is later; or (2) the dishonored instrument is not
made good by the drawer or indorser within ten days of receiving notice
of the instrument's having been dishonored.0 2 Although it is unusual to
put the burden on the accused to come foreward with evidence that there
was no fraudulent intent, the reasoning of the Model Penal Code seems
sufficient to support this exception in the case of bad checks:
In the fictitious account situation it is possible but highly improbable that
the transaction was innocent: the drawer may absent-mindedly have put
the name of the wrong bank in a blank check, or he may have intended
to open an account before the check was presented. In the case of checks
on real but inadequate accounts, the chance of innocent miscalculation by
the drawer is much greater but is pretty well negatived by a refusal to
make the check good promptly. The amounts involved may be small, and
the drawer may be a transient against whom swift action must be taken.
It seems appropriate therefore to create a basis for arresting him without
further proof of fraudulent purpose, putting the burden on him to come
forward with some evidence of innocent mistake.' 03
To use the words of the Technical Committee in summarizing the ef-
fect of the revision of the law in respect to credit cards, it is "in most re-
spects, substantively the same as the existing law governing improper trans-
actions involving credit cards.' 0 4  It is noteworthy that there is a need
only for a section dealing with misuse of credit cards, since this exemplifies
some of the advantages which flow from the systemization and consolida-
tion of the law of theft and fraud. Because many of the sections previ-
ously discussed in this note deal with misconduct which could involve credit
cards (theft, fraud or receiving stolen property), there is no need to reiter-
ate such offenses in regard to this specific form of property. Instead, there
is a need to consider only those problems which present a unique danger
from misuse of this particular kind of property. For instance, the Pro-
posed Code would prohibit knowingly buying or selling a credit card from
or to a person other than the issuer.10 5 Unlike most other kinds of trans-
101Id. § 2913.11(A).
102 Id. § 2913.11(B).
103 M.P.C. § 206.22, Comment at 118 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
104 PROP. OHIO CyIM. CODE § 2913.21, Committee Comments at 163.
'O5 PRop. OHIO CRIm. CODE § 2913.21(A)(2) (as amended in SuB. H.B. No. 511).
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actions in property, there can be no lawful justification for dealing in
credit cards; hence, the need for such a provision. Furthermore, under the
Proposed Code, making such a transaction a transgression would not be de-
pendent on the future misuse of the card in obtaining goods or services.
Rather, the transaction itself would be a misdemeanor. If, however, the
card were subsequently used to obtain goods or services valued at one
hundred fifty dollars or more, the actor would be subject to a felony prose-
cution.100
VI. CONCLUSION
The Proposed Code succeeds in putting the law of theft and fraud into
a uniform and concise set of provisions. By reducing the sheer bulk of the
existing law, by re-drafting the offenses to reflect contemporary concepts
of criminology, and by employing modern legal language, the proposed
revision would advance the law appreciably. As is inevitable in any broad
revision of the law, there are some shortcomings in this chapter. Some
confusion may be occasioned, for example, by the failure to adequately de-
fine some of the important terms. It can be anticipated that the changes
in the Proposed Code will cause transitional problems as old concepts are
abandoned in favor of new ones. The existence of such problems, how-
ever, should not unduly derogate this laudable effort to effect a badly needed
reform in the Ohio law of theft and deception.
.Michael 1. Kuhinan
1061d. § 2913.21(D).
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